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General aviation accounted for 74 percent of runway incursions but only 57 percent of the operations 
during the four-year period from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through FY2004.  Elements of the NASA Runway 
Incursion Prevention System were adapted and tested for general aviation aircraft. Sixteen General 
Aviation pilots, of varying levels of certification and amount of experience, participated in a piloted 
simulation study to evaluate the system for prevention of general aviation runway incursions compared to 
existing moving map displays.   Pilots flew numerous complex, high workload approaches under varying 
weather and visibility conditions.   A rare-event runway incursion scenario was presented, unbeknownst to 
the pilots, which represented a typical runway incursion situation.   The results validated the efficacy and 
safety need for a runway incursion prevention system for general aviation aircraft. 
 
Introduction 
The Problem 
The FAA defines Runway Incursions as, "any 
occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, 
vehicle, person or object on the ground that 
creates a collision hazard or results in loss of 
separation with an aircraft taking off, intending 
to take off, landing or intending to land." 
Runway incursions are a serious aviation safety 
hazard, particularly for general aviation 
operations.  According to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA, 2005), during the four 
year period from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through 
FY 2004, there were approximately 257 million 
aircraft operations and 1,395 runway incursions 
reported at United States towered airports – 
approximately 5.4 runway incursions for every 
one million operations.  General aviation 
accounted for 74 percent of these incursions but 
only 57 percent of the operations.  Seventy-six 
percent of the most severe incursions (114 of 150 
incursions) involved at least one general aviation 
aircraft.  
The Etiologies 
Statistics show the causes of these incursions are 
principally pilots (62%) followed by air traffic 
controllers (35%), meaning that the leading 
causes of runway incursions both involve human 
factors.  The main causal factor (56%) for pilot-
related occurrences was the pilot’s failure to 
follow an ATC clearance (Khatwa, 2002).  
Further, the FAA has analyzed runway incursion 
data and has shown the following correlating 
factors: 
• Weather not a factor (89%) 
• Pilots taxiing w/o clearance (62%) 
• Landing/ departing w/o clearance (23%) 
• Landing on the wrong runways (10%) 
• Pilot distractions (17%) 
• Pilots disoriented or lost (12%) 
• Unfamiliarity w/ ATC procedures (22%) 
• Unfamiliarity with the airport (19%) 
The Solutions 
These statistics provide a sobering view of the 
need for solutions to the problem of runway 
incursions, in general, and one with a focus 
involving the human on the flight deck.  The 
FAA has voiced its commitment to reducing the 
severity, number, and rate of runway incursions 
by implementing a combination of technology, 
infrastructure, procedural, and training 
interventions. These solutions include Airport 
Movement Area Safety System (AMASS); 
Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model 3 
(ASDE-3), ASDE Model X (ASDE-X) radar; 
multi-lateration systems; in-pavement loops; 
Runway Status Lights; (RWSL); enhanced 
controller training; airport surface operations 
advisory circulars; improved airport surface 
markings; improved education, training and 
awareness; and revised pilot/controller 
communications phraseology.  
These efforts target improved awareness and 
enhanced surveillance, but none of these 
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initiatives directly involve technology solutions 
for the flight deck. Taken together, the proposed 
FAA solutions may still not provide a 
comprehensive solution without addressing the 
flight deck.  The NTSB currently lists the 6 
“most wanted” aviation safety improvements, 
including “stop runway incursions/ground 
collisions of aircraft” and has specifically 
recommended that the FAA implement 
technology that, “give immediate warnings of 
probable collisions/incursions directly to flight 
crews in the cockpit” (cf. NTSB, 2000; 2006). 
The NASA Runway Incursion Prevention 
System has been designed to provide a flight 
deck solution to the problem of runway 
incursions.  
NASA Runway Incursion Prevention System 
Leveraging on NASA research (e.g., McCann et 
al., 1998), RIPS integrates airborne and ground-
based technologies to provide: (1) enhanced 
surface situation awareness to prevent blunders 
and errors and, (2) runway conflict alerts to 
prevent runway incidents if blunders or errors do 
occur.   
As presently envisioned, RIPS provides 
enhanced situation awareness using the pilot’s 
head-up display (HUD), Primary Flight Display 
(PFD), and an Electronic Moving Map (EMM) 
by displaying airport map information, surface 
traffic, and graphical guidance during rollout, 
turn-off, and taxi.  The system also continuously 
monitors for potential incursions and pilot 
blunders, and if detected, provides aural and 
graphical alerts.  These alerts are presented 
visually on the displays and aurally throughout 
the cockpit.  Research during both simulation 
(e.g., Young & Jones, 2001) and flight tests (e.g., 
Jones, 2001) for commercial and business 
aircraft operations have demonstrated that these 
technologies can significantly increase situation 
awareness and reduce the occurrence of runway 
incursions.   
Research Objectives 
The greatest incidence of runway incursions is 
attributable to general aviation (GA) aircraft 
operations; therefore, mitigating the occurrences 
for the GA operator could significantly enhance 
safety. Because RIPS has demonstrated 
tremendous potential for eliminating the causes 
of runway incursions for commercial and 
business aircraft operations, the research turns 
naturally toward system efficacy for GA 
operations.  The objective of the present 
experiment was to evaluate several candidate 
RIPS elements, adapted for GA operations, and 
compare them to current electronic flight bag 
(EFB) capability for prevention of GA runway 
incursions. 
Method 
General Aviation Pilots 
Sixteen GA pilots served as participants in the 
experiment with an equal distribution of flying 
experience used to represent the Part 91 
population: low-time (< 400 hours) visual flight 
rules (VFR), high-time (> 400 hours) VFR, low-
time (< 1000 hours) instrument-rated and high-
time (> 2000 hours) instrument-rated. 
Facilities/Equipment 
The simulation experiment was conducted at 
NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) using 
the Integration Flight Deck (IFD) transport 
category fixed-base high-fidelity flight simulator 
(Figure 1).  The IFD, normally a Boeing 757 
cockpit, was adapted for the experiment to take 
advantage of its excellent visual, tactile, and 
audio capabilities.  A six-degree of freedom non-
linear simulation model of the Cessna 206 (C-
206) was used for this experiment.  A collimated 
out-the-window scene was produced by an Evans 
and Sutherland ESIG 4530 graphics system 
providing approximately 200 degrees horizontal 
by 40 degrees vertical field of view at 26 pixels 
per degree. 
An electronic flight bag (EFB) display was used 
to present the airport surface map display 
concepts described below (Figure 1).  This 
display was 10.4” (26.4 cm) diagonal with a 
resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. 
An electronic research display (RD), was 
installed on the instrument panel directly in front 
of the left seat and control yoke.  The RD was 
composed of two 10.4” (26.4 cm) diagonal liquid 
crystal displays and simulated the “Baseline 
Round Dials” – that is, the standard set of 
Cessna-206 aircraft instruments: airspeed, 
attitude, altitude, vertical speed, directional gyro, 
turn and bank indicator, tachometer, and 
Instrument Landing System indicators (Figure 
2).   
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Figure 1.  Integration Flight Deck  
Experimental Design 
The experiment was designed as a 4 (display) by 
4 (weather) by 6 (task) partially factorial, mixed-
subjects design.  The between-subject factor was 
display and each participant pilot flew 19 
approaches with the one of the four display 
concepts.  On the last approach, a runway 
incursion was staged to assess the utility of the 
display concept for runway incursion prevention.  
The evaluation subject was not expecting a 
runway incursion.  
 
Figure 2.  Baseline Instruments  
Display Concepts 
Four display concepts were evaluated:  
(a) Baseline with a Moving Map and Own-
ship (BMO),  
(b) BMO + Traffic Display (BMOT),  
(c) BMO + audible runway incursion 
alerting (BAMO), 
(d) BMOT + audible and graphical runway 
incursion alerting (BAMOT).    
Figure 3 presents an example of the plan-view 
surface map with traffic displayed (BMOT). 
These display concepts were designed to 
represent a range of Electronic Flight Bags 
(EFB) and alerting applications, typical of GA 
aircraft. As shown in Figure 3, “Traffic Display” 
refers to the graphical representation of surface 
traffic on the moving map display. “Runway 
incursion alerting” involves the addition of 
computer-generated audible and/or graphical 
alerting (e.g., “Warning, Traffic Departing Two 
Five”) (Figure 4). 
When traffic data was provided, it was 
“broadcast” at a 1 Hz rate.  Own-ship position 
data was updated at a 20 Hz rate.  Positional 
errors, noise, or uncertainties were not 
introduced into these data. 
 
Figure 3.  Plan-View Surface Map with 
Traffic (BMOT) 
  
 
Figure 4.  Plan-View Surface Map with 
Traffic and Alerting (BAMOT) 
 4 
 
Evaluation Tasks  
During the 19 experimental trials, pilots 
performed 6 approach tasks at the Reno/Tahoe 
International Airport (KRNO): (1) 3-nm straight-
in approach to Runway 34R with a full-stop 
landing; (2) 3-nm straight-in to 34R with wave-
off initiated at 200 ft Above Field Level (AFL); 
(3) 3-nm straight-in approach to 34L, with 
sidestep to 34R for a full-stop landing; (4) 3-nm 
straight-in to Runway 25 with a full-stop 
landing; (5) Circle-to-land on Runway 25; from 
a Runway 34L approach and, (6) 9.56-nm 
straight-in approach with go-around initiated at 
200 ft AFL.   
Weather  
Four weather conditions were used to create the 
experimental scenarios: (1) 3 miles visibility, 
1000 ft. ceiling; (2) 3 miles visibility, 2000 ft. 
ceiling; (3) 1 mile visibility, 1000 ft ceiling; and 
(4) 1 mile visibility, 400 ft. ceiling.   
Procedure 
Each pilot participated in an extensive briefing 
and training session that was designed to mask 
the runway incursion focus of the experiment.  
Pilots flew approach tasks designed specifically 
to set-up the necessary conditions for 
presentation of the runway incursion scenario. 
The runway incursion scenario was presented on 
the last experimental run. Pilots were not 
informed of the total number of runs. Post-run 
scales (i.e., Situation Awareness Rating 
Technique, NASA-Task Load Index) and 
questionnaires were administered.   
Simulated ATC clearances were given to all 
traffic to recreate the ATC communication 
“party line” environment for participant pilots.  
Surface and airborne traffic were simulated to 
represent typical operations at KRNO (Reno). 
Runway Incursion Scenario 
The scenario began with the C-206 on approach 
aligned with Runway 34R, 3 nm from the 
threshold at 1010 ft AFL and 90 knots.  The 
weather condition was day with 1000 ft ceiling 
and 3 miles visibility. The incursion traffic 
started at the Runway 34R hold line near the 
Runway 34R threshold.  The incursion traffic 
then taxied into position on the active runway 
while the participant pilot was on final approach 
(approximately 2 nm from the threshold).  The 
incursion is categorized as a pilot deviation (i.e., 
incursion traffic not cleared for departure on 
34R).  The runway incursion scenario represents 
the most prevalent type of GA runway incursion 
(i.e., taxiing onto runways or taxiways without 
clearance) during weather conditions when they 
most often occur (i.e., day VMC). This scenario 
would engender at least a “category D” severity 
rating (see below) from the FAA dependent upon 
pilot response to the event.   
Runway Incursion Alerting 
The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) incursion 
detection algorithm (Green, 2006) was used to 
generate the alerting function for the BAMO and 
BAMOT display concepts.  The RSM monitors 
traffic that enters a three-dimensional virtual 
protection zone around the runway that is being 
used by the own-ship.  Incursion detection is 
based on the operational state of the own-ship 
and traffic, as well as other criteria (separation 
and closure rate).  Identification, position, and 
altitude data is used to track the traffic in the 
protection zone.  Traffic data projections are 
calculated within RSM since, from flight test 
experience, reliable position updates are not 
received at consistent intervals.  RSM generates 
a warning alert, which occurs when a runway 
incursion is detected and evasive action is 
required to avoid a potential collision.  
Information provided with each alert includes 
identification of the incurring traffic and 
separation distance to potential conflict.  RSM 
was developed for NASA by Lockheed Martin. 
Results 
FAA Runway Incursion Severity Ratings 
The FAA performed an independent analysis of 
the experimental data, using an FAA runway 
incursion severity rating (FAA, 2005), and 
categorized the runway incursion incident data 
from this study. 
• Category A – Separation decreases, 
extreme action taken to narrowly avoid 
collision, or collision occurs; 
• Category B – Separation decreases, 
significant potential for collision; 
• Category C – Separation decreases, 
ample time and distance to avoid 
collision; 
• Category D – Little or no chance of 
collision but meets definition of runway 
incursion. 
Using these classifications, the 16 “rare event” 
runway incursions produced fourteen scenarios 
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in the less hazardous Category C and D 
incursions, one resulted in a Category A 
incursion, and one resulted in a Category B 
incursion (see Table 1). The 14 less hazardous 
Category C and D incursions were mitigated by 
the EPs by conducting a go-around and gaining 
separation from the traffic.  Traffic awareness 
was provided by either the display concepts or 
visual acquisition out-the-window. 
The Category A runway incursion occurred with 
the EP flying the BMOT display concept.  
Despite the traffic indications on the surface map 
and out-the-window visuals, the EP 
demonstrated no awareness of the runway traffic, 
over-flew the traffic and landed. 
The Category B incident occurred when the EP 
over-flew the runway traffic (at 146 ft AFL) 
before conducting a go-around.  The EP was 
aware of the incursion after having received an 
audible alert (BAMO display concept) but 
continued to descend to visually acquire the 
traffic to confirm the alert.  This incident would 
have been classified as a Category D incursion if 
the EP had initiated the go-around at first 
awareness of the alert. 
Table 1.  Results Categorized by the FAA 
Runway Incursion Severity Ratings  
 
Pilot Display Rating 
#1 BMO D 
#2 BMOT C- 
#3 BAMO B+ 
#4 BAMOT D 
#5 BMO D 
#6 BMOT D 
#7 BAMO D 
#8 BAMOT C 
#9 BMO C 
#10 BMOT A 
#11 BAMO D 
#12 BAMOT C 
#13 BMO D+ 
#14 BMOT D+ 
#15 BAMO D 
#16 BAMOT D 
Runway Incursion Detection Reaction Time 
As shown in Figure 5, the incursion traffic was 
typically acquired sooner when the EP was 
provided with a traffic display on the surface 
map and/or incursion alerts, but the differences 
were not statistically significant at the α = 0.05 
level.   
No statistically significant differences were 
found between the display concepts for the 
distance to the incurring traffic when the pilots 
initiated a go-around or for the EP’s reaction 
time from the incursion event occurrence (based 
on a Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA) test p > 0.05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Initial Traffic Awareness 
 
Mental Workload and Situation Awareness 
After the incursion scenario, no statistical 
differences were found for overall mental 
workload or situation awareness, p>.05, between 
the display configurations.  Subjectively, the EPs 
gave significantly better ratings for audible 
alerting displays for runway incursion detection, 
F (3,15) =17.955, p<.05; likelihood of runway 
incursion prevention in real-world, F (3,15) = 
10.948, p<.05; and level of perceived safety, 
F(3,15) = 8.814, p<.05.   
Pilot Preference 
For those displays that had alerting (BAMO, 
BAMOT), there were no significant differences 
in timeliness of the alerting in terms of being 
able to take evasive action.  However, when 
pilots were asked to rate all four display concepts 
on the perceived efficacy of the alerts (F (3,15) = 
10.948, p<.05) and the additional safety value 
added (F(3,15) = 8.814, p<.05) analyses revealed 
significant effects between the displays.  
Subsequent post-hoc Student Newman Keuls 
tests showed that pilots reported that the BMO 
0
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display condition was significantly poorer than 
the other three display conditions, which were 
not significantly different from each other. 
Conclusions 
 
The experimental objective was to determine 
how different EFB and alerting concepts 
supported pilot situation awareness and 
resolution of runway incursions.  The results 
show large individual differences in response to 
an incursion event regardless of display concept. 
However, only one pilot’s performance was 
judged as a severe runway incursion risk for 
collision (with the BMOT display).  Despite 
having traffic on the display and other cues, the 
pilot was unaware of the traffic and landed just 
beyond the incursion aircraft, resulting in a near-
miss.   
 
The addition of audible alerting was found to 
enhance runway incursion detection.  
Furthermore, had the experiment simulated the 
alerting system also being installed on the 
incursion aircraft, it is less likely that situation 
would have become a runway incursion event 
(i.e., category “D”); since the incursion aircraft 
would have received an alert before taxing onto 
the active runway.   
 
The results generally match past research on 
commercial and business aircraft operations - the 
incursion alerts provided sufficient time and 
awareness to avoid a potential incursion conflict.  
Post-run briefings revealed that a surface map 
with own-ship and traffic along with audible 
alerts was considered an optimal incursion 
prevention display for GA aircraft, while an 
audible alert alone was considered a minimally 
effective display.  Over half of the pilots 
evaluated would have liked maneuver guidance 
for conflict resolution in conjunction with 
incursion alerting.  In general, the pilots reported 
feeling substantially safer during runway 
incursion incidents with onboard alerting. 
 
There is tremendous potential to significantly 
enhance safety for all classes of aircraft by using 
flight deck awareness and alerting for runway 
incursion prevention, such as that demonstrated 
herein using the NASA Runway Incursion 
Prevention System.  Future research will further 
refine the system concepts with targeted 
enhancements toward support of GA operations.   
References 
Federal Aviation Administration Office of 
Runway Safety, August 2005, FAA Runway 
Safety Report. 
 
Green, D.F. (2006). Runway safety monitor 
algorithm for single and crossing runway 
incursion detection and alerting.  NASA CR-
2006-214275 
 
Jones, D. (2001). “Runway Incursion Prevention 
System – Demonstration and Testing at the 
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.” In 
Proceedings of the 20th Digital Avionics Systems 
Conference. Daytona Beach, Florida 
 
Khatwa, R. (2002).  An analysis of runway 
incursions, 1990-2002.  Meeting of the Flight 
Safety Foundation (FSF) 55th annual 
International Air Safety Seminar (November 4-7, 
2002).  Dublin, Ireland.  
 
McCann, R.S., Foyle, D.C., Hooey, B.L., Andre, 
A.D., Parke, B., & Kanki, B. (1998).  An 
evaluation of the taxiway navigation and 
situation awareness (T-NASA) system in high-
fidelity simulation. SAE Transactions: Journal of 
Aerospace , 107 , 1612-1625.  
 
National Transportation Safety Board, Safety 
Recommendation Letter to the FAA Adminis-
trator, A-00-66, July 6, 2000. 
 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2006). 
Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improve-
ments - Aviation Issue Areas: Stop Runway 
Incursions/Ground Collisions of Aircraft.  
www.ntsb.gov/Recs/mostwanted/aviation_issues
.htm 
 
Young, S.D., & Jones, D.R. (2001).  Runway 
incursion prevention: A technology solution.  
Proceedings of the Flight Safety Foundation 54Th 
Annual International Air Safety Seminar, 54, 1-
22.  Athens, Greece: Flight Safety Foundation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
